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Abstract 
This empirical study seeks to identify key aggregate-level economic and non-economic 
determinants of the expected benefits from voting and hence aggregate voter turnout. 
A unique dimension of this study is the hypothesis that PAC (political action committee) election 
campaign contributions, e.g., to U.S. Senate races, may reduce the expected benefits of voting 
and hence voter turnout because the greater the growth of real PAC contributions, the greater the 
extent to which eligible voters may become concerned that these contributions lead to PAC 
political influence over elected officials.  Indeed, this study finds for the period 1960-2000 that 
the voter participation rate has been negatively impacted by the growth in real PAC 
contributions to Senate election campaigns. Another interesting finding is that voter turnout is 
directly/positively related to strong public approval or strong public disapproval of the 
incumbent President. This study also finds that the voter participation rate has been positively 
impacted by the opportunity to vote in Presidential elections, the Vietnam War, a “too slowly” 
growing real GDP, and inflation rates when they exceed five percent per annum. Furthermore, 
this study also finds the voter participation rate to have been negatively impacted by the public’s 
general dissatisfaction with government. 
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  1Expected Benefits of Voting and Voter Turnout 
I. Introduction  
Building on the work of Duncan Black (1948) who is credited by Gordon Tullock as the “father” 
of modern public choice theory, Anthony Downs [1957] first introduced the concept of the 
“rational voter,” from which the Rational Voter Model (RVM) derives. The basic premise of this 
theory/model is that an individual will assess the perceived costs and benefits of voting and will 
vote only if the latter outweigh the former. The complexity of the voting decision and voting 
behavior was recognized early on by Buchanan and Tullock [1962], and given full expression in 
the seminal Journal of Political Science article by Riker and Ordeshook [1968]
i.  Specifically, 
the relevant question is, given that an individual vote will have virtually zero probability of 
deciding almost any election, why do people vote at all? 
Since the introduction of the RVM, and in spite of the obviously correct notion that people 
probably should not vote, there have been numerous and highly varied studies to expand, test, 
and better understand the motivations for voting in a variety of “real world” or “experimental” 
contexts.  Assumed determinants have included age, education, closeness of the vote, multiple 
elections, ease of voter registration, weather conditions, and other electorate characteristics 
which might reflect relative benefits and costs.  Among the most important of these are the 
works (most cross-sectional, a few time-series) by Barzel and Silberberg [1973], Ashenfelter and 
Kelly [1975], Silberman and Durden [1975], Wolfinger and Rosenstone [1980], Aldrich and 
Simon [1986], Piven and Cloward [1988], Cox and Munger [1989], Teixeira [1992], Green and 
Shapiro [1994], Green and Shapiro [1994], Knack [1994], Verba, Schlozman, and Brady [1995], 
Lapp [1999], Greene and Nikolaw [1999], Knack [1999], Putnam [2000], Copeland and LaBand 
[2002],  Barreto, Seguran and Woods [2004], Cebula [2004], Borgers [2004], and Feddersen 
  2[2004].  While findings vary with the respect to individual determinants, and while some studies 
question the overall explanatory value of such determinants [Matsusaka and Palda [1999], the 
RVM has been generally substantiated. 
  Recently, Copeland and LaBand [2002], and in a limited sense, Barreto, Segura, and 
Woods [2004] and Cebula [2004], have empirically investigated a theory of “expressive voting.” 
To some extent, the study by Copeland and Laband [2002] reflects an effort to identify non-
traditional or non-demographic variables that may explain voting behavior. 
Concern over low voter participation rates in the U.S. is frequently expressed in the 
economics literature, the political science literature, the press, and elsewhere. In the words of 
Putnam [2000, p. 31], “With the singular exception of voting, American rates of political 
participation compare favorably with those in other democracies...” Putnam [2000, p. 31] 
proceeds to observe that, “We are reminded each election year that fewer voters show up at the 
polls in America than in most other democracies…” Putnam [2000, p. 32] further observes that 
poor voter turnout exists “…despite the fact that the most commonly cited barrier to voting 
[‘burdensome registration requirements’] has been substantially lowered.”  
Clearly, since election outcomes can have very profound implications for societal and 
government resource allocations, the underlying free-rider problem in the voting/not voting 
decision process may generate a huge social and economic costs. The size of government outlays 
generally and the specific directions in which public expenditures are directed influence the well 
being of the society as a whole in both the short run and the long run. So, “What determines 
voter participation, or the lack of it, in the U.S.?” Once there is a better understanding of the 
answer(s) to this question, perhaps there will also be a better answer to the question “How can 
the voter participation rate in the U.S. be increased?” 
  3Given this context, the objective of this study is to identify key aggregate-level economic 
and non-economic determinants of the expected benefits from voting and the impact thereof on 
the aggregate voter participation rate. This study seeks to achieve this objective in a framework 
that is broader and hopefully more useful than previous empirical analyses of voter turnout. The 
focus in this study is on the perspective that the decision as to whether or not to vote may involve 
“Rational, self-interested individuals [who]…engage in behavior that is not motivated directly 
[simply] by a benefit-cost calculation…” (Copeland and LaBand [2002, p. 351]) involving the 
probability of whether their individual votes will determine an election outcome. For example, it 
is hypothesized in this study that a greater growth rate in real PAC (political action committee) 
contributions to U.S. Senate elections campaigns may reduce the expected benefits of voting and 
hence voter turnout because such contributions may be perceived to lead to PACs, as opposed to 
individual voters, having influence over elected officials. It is also argued here that a factor such 
as the public’s strong approval or strong disapproval of the incumbent President per se may 
positively affect voter turnout. Indeed, it is argued in this study that these factors, along with 
such other factors as the excitement of the Presidential nomination, campaigning, and election 
process, an unpopular/controversial, protracted war such as the Vietnam War, the public’s 
dissatisfaction with government, and the inflation and real economic growth performances of the 
economy may combine to significantly affect aggregate voter turnout and hence the election of 
public officials whose decisions largely determine the allocation of public funds to the myriad 
forms of public outlay options that exist.   
II. The Empirical Framework: Expected Benefits from Voting   
Paralleling in principle the RVM, the probability that a given eligible voter will actually vote, 
PROBV, is an increasing function of the expected gross benefits (EGB) associated with voting, 
  4ceteris paribus, and a decreasing function of the expected gross costs (EGC) associated with 
voting, ceteris paribus. According, it follows that: 
  PROBV = f(EGB, EGC), fEGB > 0, fEGC  <   0        ( 1 )  
In interpreting EGB, this study argues that this concept requires a very broad, i.e., a very 
inclusive and encompassing, interpretation. For example, in most major elections, the marginal 
probability that one vote will make the difference is approximately zero. Nevertheless, certain 
circumstances or factors can potentially increase the expected benefits from voting. For example, 
when there is an issue (be it economic or non-economic in nature) or a candidate for elected 
office that an eligible voter feels particularly strongly about, voting may provide subjective 
benefits to the would-be voter because it can serve as an emotional release or outlet. That release 
may consist of expressing either approval or disapproval regarding the particular issue or 
candidate. Alternatively, certain circumstances can potentially decrease the expected benefits 
from voting. For instance, if a circumstance makes one feel disenfranchised from the 
government, e.g., if a would-be eligible voter feels that elected officials are responsive to special 
interest groups and often act with limited or no genuine regard for voters’ wishes per se, the 
would-be voter feels a reduced expected gross benefit from voting and therefore shies away from 
making the effort to vote. Thus, this study explores the perspective that the decision to vote or 
not vote can be impacted by a host of varying, often subjective, but nonetheless powerful 
circumstances.  
             To  begin,  this  study  asks  the  following question: “Does the voter participation rate 
increase when voters either strongly approve or strongly disapprove of the perceived job 
performance of the incumbent President?” To begin, it is observed that the public’s approval 
rating of the U.S. President has for decades been measured scientifically, adopting sound and 
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explained below, covers the period 1960-2000. Over this 41-year period, the mean public 
approval rating of the incumbent President was 48.13 out of a possible 100.0, with a standard 
deviation of 8.78. It is hypothesized in this study that the public has a greater incentive to vote 
when eligible voters are especially pleased or especially displeased in their perception of the 
incumbent President’s job performance. To measure whether the public is especially pleased or 
displeased with the President, the binary variable PRESAPP/DIS is introduced. The variable 
PRESAPP/DIS = 1 during those years when the President’s average public approval rating is 
either very low, defined in this study as the average Presidential approval rating minus at least 
one standard deviation (i.e., an approval rating of roughly 39 or less), or very high, defined here 
as the mean Presidential approval rating plus at least one standard deviation (i.e., an approval 
rating of roughly 57 or more). Thus, it is hypothesized that voting when one either strongly 
approves or strongly disapproves of the President provides a subjective benefit because the act of 
voting has facilitated the expression of strong feelings. Naturally, whereas an approval rating that 
is either very high or very low is expected to increase voter participation, ceteris paribus, an 
approval rating exceeding 39 but less than 57 is expected to be associated with greater voter 
apathy and hence a lower voter turnout, ceteris paribus. 
             Presidential elections offer an opportunity for individual eligible voters to vote for a very 
powerful and important policymaker (the President.) in conjunction with voting for myriad other 
candidates for public office, as well as a potential host of referenda. Hence, during Presidential 
election years (as opposed to non-Presidential election years), a given trip to the voting booth 
provides at effectively zero marginal cost an increased expected gross benefit, the added 
opportunity/benefit of voting for a Presidential candidate, and hence it provides an increased 
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invoke a high degree of emotional enthusiasm typically missing in most other election years 
(Copeland and Laband [2002]). Such enthusiasm can be fueled by a variety of circumstances, 
including such considerations as: the large number of and diverse character of the Presidential 
primaries and the drama attendant thereto; the national party nominating conventions, complete 
with speculation over prospective Vice Presidential running mates; controversial issues that arise 
during Presidential primaries and election campaigns; and issues stressed by the media. Indeed, 
the psychological rewards/benefits of fulfilling one’s “civic duty” by voting may be even more 
pronounced during a Presidential election year. Consequently, it is hypothesized in this study 
that the voter participation rate is increased by the benefits associated with a broad assortment of 
quantifiable and emotional issues generally associated with voting during the Presidential 
election years, ceteris paribus.  
  The U.S. military involvement in the Vietnam War, which escalated sharply in 1965, 
clearly can be regarded as having generated intense emotional responses among the U.S. 
electorate [Putnam (2000)]. The controversy and emotions surrounding the Vietnam War were in 
part reflected in the following: numerous anti-war demonstrations (including flag burning and 
anti-draft demonstrations), disruptions of national political party conventions where Presidential 
candidates were being nominated, intense and almost constant “hawk” versus “dove” debates, 
and daily media coverage of POWs, MIAs, casualties, and wounded, amidst the chaos that came 
to represent/symbolize the Vietnam War. Arguably, the Vietnam War created intense emotional 
responses, including an intensified effort to disengage from the Vietnam War by electing “new” 
candidates to key political offices. Indeed, the Nixon election victory over President Johnson in 
1968 might even be interpreted in part as an emotional expression on behalf of change. It is 
  7hypothesized here that the Vietnam War (VIETNAM) elicited interest levels and emotional 
reactions that raised voter interest and participation, ceteris paribus: voter participation would be 
expected to yield a benefit by providing a vehicle for expressing one’s feelings and views on this 
major public issue.  
  It is hypothesized here that greater public dissatisfaction (DIS) with government acts to 
discourage voting by eliciting a negative emotional response on the part of voters. More 
specifically, if would-be voters feel discouraged by their government because of negative 
perceptions as to whether government officials can be trusted to fulfill their responsibilities, 
whether they are dishonest, and whether government officials waste tax dollars, they very likely 
may react by adopting a negative attitude toward voting, presumably resulting from lower 
expected gross benefits from voting, so that voter turnout would tend to decline, ceteris paribus.  
To measure this variable, this study adopts the “dissatisfaction index,” DIS. DIS is constructed as 
an equally weighted average of three normalized indices reflecting responses to the University of 
Michigan’s Institute for Social Research (ISR) surveys concerning whether government 
employees can be trusted to do their assigned jobs, whether they are dishonest, and whether  
government officials waste tax dollars. Values for DIS range from a low of –1.5, for least 
dissatisfied, to a high of +1.5, for most dissatisfied. As constructed, the DIS index measures the 
public’s attitude toward government in general, as opposed to an attitude toward the President 
per se. 
  An issue that attracted widespread public attention during the year 2000 Presidential 
primaries was that of election campaign finance reform. In the midst of this debate, especially 
pronounced attention was focused on PAC election campaign contributions, i.e., election 
campaign contributions by special interest groups. From the perspective of this study, given the 
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decades, it can be argued that such contributions might well give at least some portion of the 
voting public the impression of “influence peddling,” i.e., the impression that various special 
interest groups are gaining significant influence over elected officials and candidates through 
contributing funds to their election or re-election campaigns. To the extent that voters perceive 
PAC election campaign outlays as leading to influence peddling, they may infer that politicians 
will be more sensitive to the concerns and needs of their PAC contributors than the needs and 
concerns of actual individual voters per se. Thus, it is hypothesized that the greater the extent of 
PAC election campaign contributions, the more disenfranchised voters may feel and hence the 
less the degree to which they may be inclined to make the effort to vote, ceteris paribus. To test 
this hypothesis, it is argued that the greater the magnitude of real PAC U.S. Senate election 
campaign contributions, the lower the voter participation rate, ceteris paribus. This specific 
hypothesis has never been formally tested before. It is worthy of note that in 1971 the Federal 
Election Campaign Act (FECA) repealed the Corrupt Practices Act and, along with subsequent 
amendments to FECA enacted in 1974, 1976, and 1979, the FECA statute effectively created 
modern-day PACs. 
  Feddersen [2004, p. 107] argues that individuals base their voting [participation] decision 
in part on “…assessments about the overall macroeconomic health of the economy.” 
Accordingly, it is also hypothesized in this study that the more poorly the economy is 
performing, e.g., the more slowly the economy is expanding (in real terms), the more interest the 
public (eligible voters) may have in the outcome of a major election. If indeed the economy is 
growing “too slowly,” the public may vote so as to express a wish for change at some level(s) of 
government because of fear of the unemployment prospects associated with slow real GDP 
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expected potential benefits from voting (so as to precipitate change in order to implement more 
effective economic policies and/or to at least “express displeasure” with the economy’s weak 
performance) and hence the greater the voter participation rate, ceteris paribus. In this study, any 
year in which the real GDP grows at an annual rate of less than two percent is treated as a year 
when real GDP is growing too slowly to prevent increases in the unemployment rate. In such 
years, the voter participation rate is expected to be higher, ceteris paribus.  
Naturally, the public’s assessment of the performance of the economy could be based on 
more than just this single criterion. For instance, the inflation rate may be of interest to many 
voters. Inflation reduces the purchasing power of money and unless nominal wages/income grow 
more rapidly than inflation, higher inflation reduces real income. Over the study period, nominal 
wages/income in the U.S. on the average grew at an average annual rate of nearly five percent, 
which reflected the impacts of such factors as COLAs (cost of living adjustments), increased 
compensation for productivity increases and/or investment in human capital, and/or promotions. 
Consequently, it is hypothesized in this study that when the annual inflation rate of the CPI 
exceeds  five percent, many eligible voters are more likely to vote in the hope of electing 
politicians who will pursue policies conducive to lower inflation, ceteris paribus. Voting might 
also serve as a means to express displeasure over the economy’s excessive inflation. In either 
case, the expected gross benefits from voting may rise. 
Based on the framework described above, the EGB of voting can be described by: 
EGB = g(PRESAPP/DIS, PRESDUM, VIETNAM, DIS, PAC, SLOWGR, INFLDUM), 
GPRESAPP/DIS > 0, gPRESDUM > 0, gVIETNAM > 0, gDIS <0, gPAC <0, gSLOWGR>0, gINFLDUM > 0    (2)    
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empirical investigation of determinants of the aggregate voter participation rate involves 
estimating the following: 
VPRt = a0 + a1 PRESAPP/DISt + a2 PRESDUMt + a3 VIETNAMt  
+ a4 DISt  + a5 PACt-1 + a6 SLOWGRt-1 + a7 INFLDUMt-1 + u               (3)   
where: 
VPRt = the aggregate voter participation rate in the U.S. in year t, expressed as a percent; 
a0 = constant term; 
PRESAPP/DISt = a binary variable to measure strong public approval or strong public 
disapproval of the President in year t: PRESAPP/DISt = 1 for those years in which the public’s 
average approval rating of the President was either very low (39 or less out of a possible 100.0) 
or very high (57 or more on the same scale) and PRESAPP/DISt = 0 otherwise; 
PRESDUMt = binary variable for Presidential election years: PRESDUMt = 1 during Presidential 
election years and PRESDUMt = 0 otherwise; 
VIETNAMt = a binary variable for the years during which the U.S. was militarily involved in the 
Vietnam War, such that VIETNAMt = 1 for those years and VIETNAMt = 0 otherwise; 
DISt = the level of the public’s dissatisfaction with government over year t, as measured  
by the dissatisfaction index, ranging from –1.5 for least dissatisfied to + 1.5 for most dissatisfied; 
PACt-1= total real PAC contributions to U.S Senate election/re-election campaigns in year t-1, 
expressed in millions of 1996 dollars, with the value of PAC is assumed equal to zero prior to 
1971; 
SLOWGRt-1 = a binary variable reflecting the annual percentage growth rate of real GDP in year 
t-1:  SLOWGRt-1 = 1 when the percentage growth rate of real GDP is less than two percent in 
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or more in year t-1;      
INFLDUMt-1 = a binary variable indicating whether in year t-1 the annual inflation rate of the 
CPI exceeded five percent, such that INFLDUMt-1 = 1 during those years and INFLDUMt-1 = 0 
otherwise;                                                
u = stochastic error term. 
The study period runs from 1960 through 2000. The study period begins in 1960 because 
of data unavailability for the DISt variable prior to 1960. The VPRt is measured only for even-
numbered years. This is because even-numbered years are when all members of the U.S. House 
of Representatives and one-third of the U.S. Senate are elected and, on alternate even-numbered 
years (“leap years”) when the President also is elected. The odd-numbered years typically do not 
correspond to the election of large numbers of “significant” officials. The values for PACt-1 are 
assumed equal to zero until 1971, when FECA effectively opened the door for the establishment 
of legal PACs. The VPRt data and the data for PACt-1 were obtained from: 
 www.infoplease.com
The variable DISt is represented by the “dissatisfaction index,” obtained from the ISR at the 
University of Michigan:  
http://www.isr.umich.edu
 The data used to construct INFLDUMt-1 and SLOWGRt-1 were obtained from the Council of 
Economic Advisors [2003, Tables, B-64, B-2]. The data for the Presidential approval rating were 
obtained from: 
 Thttp://www.geocities.com/americanpresidencynet/approval.htm
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series for variables DISt and PACt-1  are stationary only in first differences. Hence, in the 
estimation provided below, these two variables are expressed in first differences. The VPR series 
is marginally stationary at the ten percent level in levels, reflecting in part the rise in the voter 
participation rate in the year 2000 election.  
Given that VPRt is contemporaneous with the dissatisfaction index, DISt, the possibility 
of simultaneity bias exists. To account for this possibility, the model in equation (3) was 
estimated using an instrumental variables (IV) technique, with the instrument being the two-year 
lag of the maximum marginal federal personal income tax rate, MAXt-2. On economic grounds, 
the choice of instrument was based on the findings in Cebula, Koch, and Paul (1998, p. 497) that 
“…the public’s dissatisfaction with government…was an increasing function of the federal 
personal income tax rate.” On technical grounds, the choice of instrument was based on the 
finding that DISt and MAXt-2 are highly correlated, whereas the two-period lagged instrument is 
not contemporaneous with the error terms in the system. The MAXt-2 data were obtained from: 
www.taxfoundation.org/prtopincometable.html
III. Empirical Findings 
Estimating equation (3) by IV, using the White (1980) heteroskedasticity correction, yields:  
VPRt =+21.1 + 32.24 PRESAPP/DISt  + 11.42 PRESDUMt  + 4.41 VIETNAMt  - 256.3 zDISt 
                           (+5.51)                          (+9.13)                       (+5.52)                      (-4.90)  
  - 0.33 zPACt-1 + 7.3 SLOWGRt-1 + 3.37 INFLDUMt-1 
  (-2.00)             (+4.47)          (+2.62)                    
DW = 1.79, Rho = 0.09                      (4) 
  13where terms in parentheses are t-values and z is the first differences operator. In equation (4), all 
seven of the estimated coefficients exhibit the expected signs, with six being statistically 
significant at the two percent level or beyond, and one being significant at beyond the seven 
percent level. The D-W and Rho statistics imply the absence of serial correlation problems.   
The estimated coefficient on the PRESAPP/DIS variable is positive and significant at the 
one percent level. This finding suggests, as hypothesized in this study, that when the public 
strongly approves or strongly disapproves of the job performance of the incumbent President, 
they turn out in greater numbers than otherwise would be the case to express either that strong 
approval  or strong disapproval. Venting such feelings may generate increased benefits from 
voting.   
The estimated coefficient on the PRESDUM variable is positive and significant at the one 
percent level. This confirms the hypothesis that during Presidential election years voter 
participation rates increase because the outcome(s) of the election is (are) perceived as more 
important, so that the expected potential benefits from voting are enhanced while presumably 
reflecting emotions ranging from simple enthusiasm, perhaps almost reminiscent of 
“cheerleading” (Copeland and Laband [2002], Barreto, Segura, and Woods [2004], Cebula 
[2004]) on the one hand to emotional responses (involving arguably greater substance) to 
candidate positions, the candidates themselves, or party platforms on sensitive issues such as 
abortion, religion, the environment, and affirmative action on the other hand. Thus, possibly for 
multiple reasons, voting in Presidential election years may increase the expected value/benefit of 
voting. 
The coefficient on the VIETNAM variable is positive, as expected, and significant at the 
one percent level. This finding is perhaps suggestive of a strong emotional pull by the “War” 
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regarding military involvement in Vietnam, i.e., the possibility of ending U.S. involvement in the 
Vietnam War may have increased the expected benefit/value of voting. Thus, the documented 
unpopularity of and controversy over the Vietnam War appears to have led to increasing voter 
participation. The lesson from this result may be that protracted controversial or “unpopular” 
wars are likely to induce increased voter participation (and, arguably, of a nature that on balance 
is anti-incumbent). 
The coefficient on the variable DIS is negative, as expected, and significant at the one 
percent level, presumably suggesting that the more dissatisfied the voting-eligible population is 
with government in general and perceived government officials’ trustworthiness, 
honesty/dishonesty, and use of tax revenues, the more discouraged from participation in the 
voting process they become. This suggests a form of disappointment and a negative emotional 
reaction to even “bothering” to vote, i.e., the DIS variable reflects disillusionment with 
government and a correspondingly diminished expected gross benefit from voting.  
The estimated coefficient on the PAC variable is negative but significant in this 
estimation at only the 6.7 percent level. This result would seem to suggest, albeit somewhat 
weakly, that greater PAC Senate election campaign contributions may lead to reduced voter 
participation rates. This specific possibility has not heretofore been investigated in the published 
literature. In any case, this finding, if true, might suggest that at least some voters feel politically 
disenfranchised by PAC contributions; thus, at least some eligible voters may expect lower gross 
benefits from voting due to the PAC contributions. Statistically, the somewhat modest t-statistic 
for this variable in equation (3) is attributable to moderate multicollinearity with the dummy 
variables for excessive inflation and slow economic growth. As shown in Table 1, however, once 
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becomes statistically significant at acceptable levels (while remaining negative) in all cases. 
The coefficient on the SLOWGR variable is positive and significant at the one percent 
level. This result suggests strongly that when the growth rate of real GDP is relatively slow (i.e., 
less than two percent per annum), eligible voters to some extent envision greater stakes (greater 
expected gross benefits) in acting to help ensure the election of politicians whose economic 
policies may more effectively stimulate economic growth and therefore job growth and 
employment security and/or use votes to express displeasure over slow real GDP growth.  
Finally, the estimated coefficient on the INFLDUM variable is positive and significant at 
the two percent level. The interpretation on this finding is that, on balance, the public 
disapproves of inflation if it exceeds five percent annually and expresses this disapproval by 
increasing its voter participation. Presumably, once inflation exceeds five percent, it exceeds the 
growth rate of income for many voters, who experience a net deterioration of their purchasing 
power despite COLAs and other factors contributing to rising nominal earnings. Under these 
conditions, voting provides an increased expected gross benefit: an opportunity to express 
disapproval and/or to attempt to precipitate economics policy change(s). 
To investigate further the voter-participation impact of the factors identified in this 
model, three variations on the system shown in equation (3) have been estimated by IV, each 
adopting the White (1980) heteroskedasticity correction. The results of these estimations are 
provided in columns (1), (2) and (3) of Table 1. As shown in Table 1, 15 of the 17 coefficients 
are statistically significant with the expected signs at the one percent level, whereas the 
remaining two coefficients are significant with the expected signs at the five percent level. 
Observe that the estimated coefficient on the PAC variable is now statistically significant at an 
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multicollinearity problem referred to above. In sum, it appears that the voter participation rate in 
this expanded rational voter model has been found to be an increasing function of strong public 
approval or strong public disapproval of the incumbent President, the opportunity to participate 
in a Presidential election, the Vietnam War (possibly as a surrogate for a protracted unpopular or 
at least highly controversial war), a “too slowly” growing real GDP, and an annual inflation rate 
of five percent or more. Furthermore, the voter participation rate appears to be a decreasing 
function of the public’s dissatisfaction with government and the growth in real PAC Senate 
election campaign contributions. 
 
   TABLE  1 
Alternative IV Estimations 
Variable    Estimation (1) Estimation (2) Estimation (3) 
Constant   +16.1   +35.83   +36.88 
 
PRESAPP/DIS  +42.37** +14.39** +15.68** 
   (+4.16)   (+6.40)   (+4.73) 
 
PRESDUM   +10.2**  +10.58**  +9.53** 
   (+6.85)   (+8.19)   (+6.10) 
 
VIETNAM   +6.08**  +12.22**  +13.69** 
   (+4.14)   (+6.57)   (+6.22) 
 
zDIS    -359.5**  -59.6** -68.44** 
   (-3.79)   (-6.35)   (-4.48) 
 
zPAC    -0.47** -0.38*   -0.48** 
   (-3.02)   (-2.26)   (-3.00) 
 
SLOWGR   +1.06**   
   (+3.60)    
 
INFLDUM     +2.41* 
  17     (+2.06) 
 
DW    1.80   1.89   1.93 
Rho    0.09   0.04   0.02 
 
Terms in parentheses are t-values. 
**Statistically significant at the one percent level. 
*Statistically significant at the five percent level. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
This study has endeavored to identify key aggregate-level determinants of the expected benefits 
from voting and hence key aggregate voter participation rate determinants in the U.S. so as to 
help improve understanding of and forecasting of voter turnout. Following Copeland and 
LaBand [2002], Barreto, Segura, and Woods [2004] and Cebula [2004], we have attempted to 
incorporate variables that might capture the effects of  “expressive” voting, that is, measures 
which capture the effects of differences in attitudes among potential voters.  The analysis   
especially focuses on the voter-turnout impact of growing real PAC contributions to U.S. Senate 
election campaigns. 
  Using aggregate time series covering the period 1960-2000, several interesting and 
significant results are obtained.  First, the voter participation rate tends to be higher when the 
public expresses either strong approval  or strong disapproval of the job the President is 
perceived as doing while in office. Second, the opportunity to vote in a Presidential election 
appears to induce a greater voter turnout. Third, the greater the public’s expressed dissatisfaction 
with government, i.e., (1) the greater the degree to which the public doubts that government 
officials can be trusted, (2) the more the public feels government officials are dishonest, and (3) 
the greater the extent to which the public feels that government wastes tax dollars, the lower the 
voter participation rate.  Fourth, the Vietnam War had a positive and significant impact on voter 
  18participation. This issue may have galvanized an otherwise potentially somewhat free-riding, 
somewhat apathetic public into a voter coalition with a greater propensity to vote in order to 
promote a specific agenda. This particular finding may be capable of being generalized into a 
rule of thumb by which it is possible to conjecture that any protracted, unpopular war might act 
to elicit greater voter turnout. Clearly, this factor could potentially imply marginally important 
voter turnout developments in the U.S. in terms of the War in Iraq. Until hostilities involving the 
U.S. military in Iraq and the Iraqi occupation are both completed, however, this issue may not be 
ready to be fully investigated in an unbiased way. This is all the more true since there is a milieu 
involving terrorism against the U.S. beginning with September 11, 2001, within which the Iraqi 
issue must be interpreted. Next, it would appear that the growth of real PAC Senate election 
campaign contributions, an issue not previously investigated, has led to a reduction in voter 
turnout, possibly because such “contributions” may lead voters to feel politically disenfranchised 
and to experience a decline or loss in expected benefits from voting, perhaps in the form of 
expected lost influence over elected officials. On the economics front, a slower growing real 
GDP, i.e., a performance of less than two percent annual growth, tends to raise the voter 
participation, perhaps because such a slowly growing economy is perceived as posing a threat of 
rising unemployment. Finally, it appears that an inflation rate exceeding five percent annually 
tends to elevate voter participation, presumably because once the inflation rate has reached such 
proportions, it is reducing the real income of a significant portion of the voting (or at least 
potentially voting) public. 
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i It would be hard to overestimate the importance of these three works with respect to voting 
theory and models and with the development of public choice in general and perhaps we should 
pay them due respect here.  Whereas most works are cited not at all or only a few times, each of 
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these has been referenced and cited literally hundreds of times.  The Duncan Black book [1948] 
had achieved a citation rate of more than 25 per year by the early nineties [Durden, 1991] and the 
Buchanan and Tullock [1962] tome receives upwards of 40 annually [Durden and Millsaps, 
1996].  At last count, the Downs [1958] volume was receiving an average of more than 70 cites 
per year [Durden, 1991], while the Riker and Ordeshook paper [1968] receives about 10 cites per 
year [Maske and Durden, 2003] after 35 years, truly remarkable for a journal article.  According 
to a ranking scheme developed in Durden and Ellis [1993], the Riker-Ordeshook piece is a 
classic paper, Black, and Buchanan and Tullock are “super” classics and the Downs book is 
really in a class with few peers. 
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